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Abstract
Background: Individual differences in human cognitive abilities show consistently positive correlations across diverse
domains, providing the basis for the trait of ‘‘general intelligence’’ (g). At present, little is known about the evolution of g, in
part because most comparative studies focus on rodents or on differences across higher-level taxa. What is needed,
therefore, are experiments targeting nonhuman primates, focusing on individual differences within a single species, using a
broad battery of tasks. To this end, we administered a large battery of tasks, representing a broad range of cognitive
domains, to a population of captive cotton-top tamarin monkeys (Saguinus oedipus).
Methodology and Results: Using a Bayesian latent variable model, we show that the pattern of correlations among tasks is
consistent with the existence of a general factor accounting for a small but significant proportion of the variance in each
task (the lower bounds of 95% Bayesian credibility intervals for correlations between g and task performance all exceed
0.12).
Conclusion: Individual differences in cognitive abilities within at least one other primate species can be characterized by a
general intelligence factor, supporting the hypothesis that important aspects of human cognitive function most likely
evolved from ancient neural substrates.
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Introduction
Whenever humans are presented with cognitive tasks where a
correct response can be objectively determined, their performanc-
es are almost always positively correlated [1,2]. This consistent
finding implies a ‘‘general intelligence’’ (g) factor, a capacity that
unifies or underpins all human cognitive abilities [3,4]. Scores on
g-loaded ability tests show substantial genetic influence [5] and a
diverse array of physiological correlates that include overall brain
volume [6,7]. This is intriguing because brain size is known to
have increased substantially over the evolution of the primate
lineage leading to Homo sapiens sapiens [8].
If there are indeed evolutionary homologues of the mechanisms
subserving the g factor in humans, then sufficient extant genetic
variation should lead to similar factors underlying performance on
cognitive tasks in other primates. A recent meta-analysis of several
primate genera provides support for this prediction [9]. Further
evidence is required, however, before the general factor among
genera can be attributed to causal sources similar to those
underlying human g. In particular, it is presently unclear whether
the positive correlations found across primate species arise because
of an intrinsic dependence on a set of common mechanisms—as in
humans [10,11]—or because of spurious sources of association.
What is necessary, therefore, is a detailed study of within-species
variation. To date, the most substantial evidence for a general
factor in animals comes from laboratory studies of mice and rats
[12–18]. Studies of primates are either limited because of the
narrow range of tasks within the test battery or because of
contrasts between taxa. The primary goal of our study was to
explore the possibility of a homologue to general intelligence in a
nonhuman primate species using a broad task battery. To this end,
we tested a sample of 22 cotton-top tamarin monkeys (Saguinus
oedipus) on 11 tasks covering a wide range of cognitive domains.
Our battery included the following tasks: occluded reach, targeted
reach, A-not-B, reversal learning, exploration, numerical discrim-
ination, acoustic discrimination, object tracking, social tracking,
hidden reward retrieval, and a food extraction puzzle. Using a
Bayesian latent variable analysis, we provide evidence of a general
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this primate species.
Results
Because it was not possible to quantitatively asses the cognitive
performance of non-human primates across a broad range of tasks
using fine-grained numerical scales, we represented the data
collected during our experiment in the form of ranks.. Given our
use of ranked observations, standard repeated measures analyses
were not appropriate. We therefore analyzed our data using a
Bayesian latent variable model that was previously used for inter-
species analysis of non-human primate cognitive data and has
been vetted in the mainstream statistical literature [9,19]. Using
this model framework, we first estimated the loading of each task
on a group factor (reflecting a particular cognitive domain or
function) and on a top-level general factor analogous to the human
g factor. The posterior expectations of the task-specific variances
ranged from 1.00 to 1.35, while the posterior expectations of the
group factors’ variances ranged from 0.012 to 0.045. It is clear that
a much greater proportion of the variance in the posited latent
variable underlying any given task is attributable to task-specific
sources such as experimental error rather than to a group factor.
This implies that the correlational structure of the tasks can be
accounted for by a general factor alone. For this reason we re-
estimated the model without the group factors. Checks of model
adequacy indicated sufficient fit (Supplemental Figures S1 and S2).
We next computed the marginal posterior distribution of the
proportion of latent variance underlying each task attributable to
the general factor. The square root of this proportion gives the ‘‘g-
loading’’ of the task, which can be interpreted as the correlation
between performance on the task and the general factor. Several
features are evident from the posterior histograms of the
proportions of the task variances attributable to the general factor
(Figure 1). Critically, the modal estimate of every task’s loading on
the general factor is always positive (Table 1). This finding is of
course consistent with the presence of a genuine general factor.
However, although the 95% credibility intervals always exclude
zero, the loadings are typically quite small, especially relative to
what is usually observed in human cognitive test batteries [2,6].
Interestingly, three of the four tasks with the lowest loadings
(targeted reach, social tracking, exploration) are the ones with
arguably the weakest claims to membership in the domain of
cognitive abilities. This domain can be defined as those items or
tests that tax a mental ability and to which responses can be
unambiguously scored from very wrong to very right [1,4]. This
domain description can in turn be clarified by defining a ‘‘right’’
response as a decision made ‘‘on some grounds of truth:
correspondence to reality or soundness of inference’’ [20] (p.
61). While the three aforementioned tasks were included in the
battery based on prior research suggesting that they were
correlated with cognitive ability, high performance scores on
these tasks do not entail evidence of computations modeling
reality. For example, it cannot be either right or wrong for an
animal to spend any particular amount of time in the various parts
of the box in the exploration task. In this light it is also notable that
the tasks with the highest g loadings, including A-not-B and
numerical discrimination, clearly fall within the cognitive domain,
tapping capacities such as inhibitory control and number
representation.
For each task we computed the posterior probabilities that it has
a higher g loading than any other task, and the separation of the
most and least g-loaded tasks is fairly clear (Supplemental Table
S1). However, it may be that the pattern of loadings is partly
attributable to differences across tasks in reliability. An examina-
tion of those tasks with replications suggests potentially significant
differences in reliability (Supplemental Table S2).
64.5% of the pairwise comparisons in the observed data that did
not result in ties were correctly predicted by the posterior
expectations of the hi. The significance of this result can be tested
under a frequentist approach. For each entry of the raw data
matrix that is not missing, we drew a random sample from a
standard normal distribution. The estimate of each subject’s ability
from this pseudo-data was taken to be the mean of its random
draws. The random draws within each task were then adjusted to
reflect the structure of ties in the real data. For instance, if a task
yielded a four-way tie for first, the scores of the subjects ranked two
through four on this task in the pseudo-data were set equal to the
score of the top-ranked subject. We counted the proportion of
pairwise comparisons in the pseudo-data not resulting in ties that
were correctly predicted by the pseudo-estimates of ability.
In 10,000 replicates of this simulation, the proportion of
replicates yielding a prediction rate exceeding that obtained in the
actual data using the posterior expectations of the hi was only
0.0236. Note that we have not shown that ordering the subjects by
their pseudo-data means is optimal for purposes of retaining the
null hypothesis that the prediction rate reflects mere capitalization
on chance. Nevertheless we take the low empirical p-value from
our simulations as converging evidence that the posterior
distributions of the hi reflect the genuine structure in the data
that is captured by our model of a general factor.
Discussion
In this study we applied a Bayesian latent variable model of rank
data to the results of a battery of 11 cognitive tasks administered to
22 cotton-top tamarins. These tasks are posited to measure a
diversity of cognitive processes and content domains, including
executive control, memory, attention, and problem solving, in
social and non-social situations, with food and non-food
motivators. The results provide evidence of individual differences
in a general factor (g) of cognitive ability in cotton-top tamarins.
The magnitude of the g factor’s influence appears to increase as
the task engages more systematic cognitive control, although the
limitations of our data preclude certainty on this point.
One significant contrast with patterns typical of human data is
an absence of compelling evidence for any group factors. A similar
result emerged in the meta-analysis of primate genera conducted
by Deaner et al. [9]. At present, we cannot offer a clear
explanation for this disparity. One possibility is that experimental
noise and task-specific sources of variance in measurements of
nonhuman primates are substantially increased relative to their
typical levels in human testing. The few tasks with replications do
suggest that some tasks have rather low reliabilities (Supplemental
Table S2). As a result, the contribution of group factors may be
more difficult to discern in animal data. Note that this possibility
also complicates any attempts to draw inferences from the fact that
the estimated loadings of our tasks on their general factor are
much smaller than typical g-loadings of ability tests taken by
humans [4]. In future studies of this kind, we recommend the use
of larger samples with more complete data sets per subject, thus
leading to narrower credibility intervals. Further development of
the Bayesian latent variable model used in this study may also
allow replications of tasks to separate measurement error and task-
specific variance. Such measures may shed light on the reasons for
the relatively low loadings on the general factor observed in this
study. If the smaller loadings turn out not to be solely attributable
to measurement error, it may be that one trend in the evolutionary
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interfaces among distinct cognitive processors, some domain-
general (e.g., memory, attention, executive control), and others
domain-specific (e.g., object knowledge, mental state attribution).
It is sometimes argued that the presence of a general cognitive
factor is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the human mind
consists of highly specialized, domain-specific modules [23]. We
reject this argument, appealing to a distinction between the
qualitative architecture of cognition and the structure of
quantitative differences [6,24]. The explanations for the phenom-
ena arising within these two spheres may reside in different levels
of the reductionist hierarchy. For example, variation in low-level
global properties of the neural substrate may induce a general
factor underlying quantitative differences in high-level modules
with distinct functions and operating principles. Indeed, discrim-
inations making explicit use of number in the numerical
discrimination task depend on a system for precise counts of
distinct objects that is distinguishable from another system for the
approximate representation of large magnitudes [25]. Further,
systems that are specialized for solving one problem can be either
constrained or enhanced by interfaces with other systems, either
domain-specific or domain-general. For example, though the
recursive operations that underpin language are virtually limitless
(generating discrete infinity with respect to the number of
meaningful expressions), they are constrained in comprehension
and production by our domain-general working memory system.
In sum, we argue that both architectural features and quantitative
differences are worthy topics of investigation for evolutionarily-
Figure 1. Posterior histograms of Var(h)/[(1/cj) + Var(h)]. The proportion of variance in the latent variable underlying the jth task attributable to
the general factor. Each panel displays the marginal posterior histogram of this proportion. The square root of the proportion is called the ‘‘loading’’
of the task on the general factor—the correlation between the task and the general factor.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005883.g001
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functions, as well as cognitive scientists interested in the
mechanisms that support these capacities.
One goal of our study was to secure evidence supporting the
intrinsic nature of the general factor found in comparisons of
different primate genera. As the presence of a general factor within
a primate species indicated by a similar number and diversity of
tasks indeed strengthens this supposition, our study has been
successful in this regard. However, our pairwise prediction rate of
64.5%, although significantly greater than expected by chance, is
smaller than the 85% found in the meta-analysis of primate genera
[19]. Many of our tasks were similar to those considered in this
meta-analysis. If we assume some similarity between the general
factors found in the two studies and comparability of such relevant
features as the degree of experimental noise, then the lower
prediction rate in the tamarin comparisons suggests that variation
among taxa in the general factor is large relative to variation
within this species. Substantial variation among taxa is consistent
with an important role for differentiation along this dimension in
the evolution of the primate order.
Further research is necessary regarding the relationships among
the respective general factors within different primate species
(including Homo sapiens) and the general factor across primate taxa.
In particular, we need a much more detailed analysis of the causal
or correlational nature of the different neural and psychological
processes that facilitate or constrain task performance. There is a
significant positive correlation between the primate general factor
and brain volume [26], a pattern observed within humans as well
[27]. Future studies might seek to establish similar relationships
between the replicated physiological correlates of the human g
factor (brain size, white matter connectivity, levels of the neural
metabolite N-acetylaspartate; for a review see [6]) and primate
general factors at varying taxonomic levels. Of additional interest
will be the connectivity between different domain-specific systems
(e.g., capacity to understand others’ mental states and abilities for
numerical quantification in the context of cooperative games) and
their links to more domain-general processes (e.g., memory for
prior interactions and participants).
We acknowledge the great practical difficulties posed by a
research program seeking to find such relationships within
different primate species. There are, however, indications in the
literature that it can be accomplished [28]. A promising place to
begin is with species that are abundantly available in captivity, be
they in research sites or zoos. For example, zoos and research labs
throughout the United States have access to chimpanzees, rhesus
monkeys and squirrel monkeys, three species representing each of
the primary taxonomic groups (i.e., apes, old world monkeys, and
new world monkeys). Such a research program is worthwhile
because of the great theoretical interest that would attach to any
positive results. In particular, we think of intelligence as a hallmark
of the human species. But the mechanisms and representations
that enter into human intelligence are unclear, as are the paths
leading to its evolution. By specifying these ingredients, including
the relevance of both domain-specific (e.g., language, number,
theory of mind) as well as domain-general (e.g., inhibitory control,
recursive computation, and attention) processes, we will be in a
stronger position to guide future research into the cognitive
evolution of our species.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
All tasks conformed to the animal subject regulatory standards
enforced by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee
(IACUC) at Harvard University. The IACUC protocol number is
92-16, approved on 6/30/08. The welfare of the animals
conformed to the requirements of the National Institute of Mental
Health (NIMH). All animals were housed in cages exceeding the
sizes stipulated in said requirements, together with conspecifics in
their natural group compositions. All animals were given access to
a rich diet of foods and engagement with a variety of
psychologically enriching tasks. No animal was physically harmed
or deliberately exposed to potential infection.
General Procedure
We tested 22 adult cotton-top tamarin monkeys (10 females and
12 males) of mixed experimental history. Subjects ranged in age
from 3 to 17 years. All subjects were housed in the same colony
room in the Cognitive Evolution Laboratory at Harvard
University. In addition to food given in experiments, all subjects
were fed a nightly meal and maintained at approximately 10% less
than their free-feeding weights in captivity; thus, we maintained
subjects at a weight that more closely approximated those
observed among wild subjects (400–465 g).
The battery consisted of 11 tasks that were administered
between March 2007 and December 2007. Tasks were always
administered between the hours of 8 am and 5 pm. Data were not
collected on days where we anticipated any exceptional cause for
excitement in the tamarin colony, such as a veterinary check or lab
construction.
All experimenters were required to practice the task procedures
together until attaining a high degree of uniformity in adminis-
tration. Prior to each task, subjects voluntarily moved from their
home cage into a transport cage and were then transferred to the
appropriate testing room. By restricting testing to animals that
voluntarily left their home cage, we provided more consistency
with respect to motivational state.
Although we attempted to test all 22 subjects on each task, this
was not possible due to several uncontrollable factors, including
routine medical care, pregnancy, and occasional unwillingness to
voluntarily enter the transport cage on the day of testing.
Task Descriptions
The following provides a synopsis of each task within our
battery; more details are given in Supplemental Protocol S1.
Descriptive statistics are provided in Supplemental Table S3.
Table 1. Estimated Loadings of Cognitive Tasks on General
Factor (Bayesian 95% credibility intervals in parentheses).
task loading on general factor
A-not-B .542 (.287, .775)
occluded reach .449 (.268, .623)
reversal learning .421 (.206, .595)
food extraction puzzle .397 (.206, .595)
object tracking .346 (.163, .589)
numerical discrimination .346 (.167, .561)
acoustic discrimination .302 (.152, .483)
exploration .286 (.133, .473)
hidden reward retrieval .285 (.128, .473)
social tracking .253 (.121, .404)
targeted reach .249 (.127, .392)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005883.t001
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placed a food item (a quarter of a piece of Froot Loop cereal) in
one of three positions behind a transparent Plexiglas barrier
positioned in front of the subject’s cage. In the right and left
conditions, the experimenter placed the food at the edge of either
side of the Plexiglas barrier; half of the food was positioned behind
the barrier, and the other half was exposed to the subject. In the
center condition, the food was located directly behind the center of
the transparent barrier. The subject participated in five sessions of
this task consisting of twelve trials each over five consecutive days.
Each food position condition was presented four times within a
session, and condition order was counterbalanced across all twelve
trials. The percentage of center trials in which the subject
successfully reached around the barrier (i.e., inhibited reaching
straight for and into the barrier) to access the food was recorded
for each session.
Targeted reach. A cable-tie glued to the top of the subject’s
transport cage was loaded with half of a raisin. The cable-tie and
raisin were raised to a 60-degree angle by the side of the subject’s
cage, released, and allowed to oscillate in front of the subject’s cage
door. The subject was free to reach its hands or mouth through a
small square hole in the transport cage door in order to grasp the
swinging raisin. This procedure was repeated for five trials in a
single session. The time required for the subject to successfully
grasp the raisin was measured for each trial. Similar studies of
rhesus macaques indicate that this type of task co-activates visual
motion processing and motor command responses in the cerebral
cortex [29].
A-not-B. Two opaque barriers were positioned in front of the
subject’s transport cage. Froot Loop quarters were placed behind
barrier A on five consecutive trials. On the sixth trial, the subject
watched the experimenter place the food behind barrier B. We
recorded whether, on this sixth trial, subject reached behind the
incorrect barrier A or the correct barrier B.
Reversal learning. The experimenter wore a red glove on
one hand and a green glove on the other. Subjects were taught to
associate a food reward (a quarter of a Froot Loop) with either the
red glove or the green glove. In the test phase, the food reward was
presented to the subject as in the training phase, except that the
reward was concealed in the hand bearing the opposite-colored
glove. In order to pass the test phase, the subject was required to
choose correctly on ten out of the twelve trials in one session. The
number of sessions required to pass the test phase were recorded.
Exploration. On consecutive days, subjects were taken to a
large, open-field box to participate in seven different task
conditions. Each subject was allowed to move about freely inside
the box for five minutes. In five of the seven conditions, a different
stimulus was located in the center of the box. In the two baseline
conditions, no stimulus was present inside the box. Several
dependent measures were examined as indicators of the subject’s
overall exploratory behavior and novelty preference. These
dependent measures included time spent moving (versus
stationary), time spent in physical contact with the stimulus, and
time spent in each quadrant of the box. This task is similar to one
that has been found to be correlated with a general cognitive factor
in studies of mice [15,30]. In humans, preference for novel objects
in infancy has been found to predict IQ at later ages [31].
Numerical discrimination. Subjects watched as the
experimenter loaded two clear petri dishes with different
quantities of food items (quarters of Froot Loops). The following
contrasts were used: 1 v. 2, 1 v. 3, 1 v. 4, 1 v. 5, 2 v. 3, 2 v. 4, 3 v. 4,
and 4 v. 5. The subject was then allowed to choose one of the petri
dishes by reaching a hand or mouth through one of two small
holes in the transport cage. The subject was run in three sessions of
this task consisting of ten trials each over three consecutive days.
The proportion of trials in which the subject chose the larger
number of food items was recorded. Variants of this task have
been administered in previous studies assessing the cue (volume,
density, or number) by which tamarins, marmosets, and rhesus
macaques discriminate between two quantities of food [32,33].
Acoustic discrimination. Subjects’ rates of habituation to
four biologically meaningful acoustic stimuli were measured. The
four stimuli consisted of a tamarin alarm call, a goshawk alarm
call, and the contact calls of two members of the lab colony known
to the subjects. Stimuli were played when the subject was looking
away from the speaker in order to allow for a maximal orientation
response. A response was defined as orienting up and toward the
speaker located behind the transport cage during the stimulus
exposure or within two seconds of its termination. The subject was
scored as habituated to the stimulus when it failed to orient toward
the speaker for three consecutive stimulus exposures. The number
of exposures required to habituate to each of the four stimulus
conditions was measured; fewer needed exposures indicated better
performance. A nearly identical protocol was used in a previous
study of tamarins’ patterns of habituation to the contact calls of
familiar conspecifics [34]. Rapidity of habituation by human
infants to previously presented stimuli is surprisingly predictive of
their IQs measured at much later ages [35].
Object tracking. We measured the time that a subject spent
tracking each of two different stimuli: a raisin (food object) and a
metal screw (non-food object). The subject was exposed to both
stimulus conditions once within a single session. The experimenter
presented each stimulus for two seconds at a distance of 5 cm from
the subject’s cage door and then moved the stimulus in a fixed
pattern comprised of straight lines, diagonal lines, and figure-8s. The
percentage of the presentation time that the subject spent looking at
the moving stimulus was measured for each condition. General
attentional processes have been shown to be an important factor in
tamarins’ rate of learning in operant conditioning tasks [36].
Social tracking. Subjects were positioned inside a transport
cage that was adjacent to a second transport cage containing a
‘‘stooge’’ ’animal. The transport cages were divided by an opaque
barrier preventing the two animals from viewing each other except
through four peepholes located in each corner of the barrier. The
subject was allowed to watch the stooge through the peepholes
while the stooge was foraging for pieces of Froot Loop cereal in a
woodchip-filled trough attached to the side of the stooge’s cage.
Though the subject could easily view the stooge, the positioning of
the adjacent cages largely prevented the subject from viewing the
trough. As a result the majority of the subject’s time spent looking
through the peepholes involved tracking the stooge rather than the
food stimulus. The subject was allowed to look through the
peepholes during a single 60-second trial. The total time that the
subject spent tracking the stooge through any of the four peepholes
was measured.
Hidden reward retrieval. Subjects watched an experi-
menter bury a quarter of a Froot Loop in one of two food wells
filled with woodchips. In each condition a different delay length
was imposed before the food wells were pushed against the
subject’s transport cage. The subject was exposed to seven delay
conditions on consecutive days in the following order: no delay, 5-
second delay, 10-second delay, 15-second delay, 20-second delay,
25-second delay, and 30-second delay. Each condition consisted of
10 trials. If the subject chose the incorrect well on a given trial, the
experimenter immediately pulled both wells away from the
subject’s transport cage and revealed the food reward hidden in
the unselected well. The total number of trials where the subject
chose the correct well was recorded for each delay condition.
General Intelligence Primate
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containing half of a grape at its midpoint was placed inside the
front of the subject’s transport cage. The subject was allowed to
manipulate the tube in an attempt to extract the grape for a
maximum of ten minutes. The subject had to solve the puzzle by
extracting the grape using its tongue rather than its hands, which
were too large to fit inside the tube. The time required by the
subject to extract the food reward was measured for each trial.
The subject was run in two consecutive ten-minute trials within
one session of this task.
Model Specification and Estimation
Although batteries of cognitive tests administered to humans
show a clear dominant dimension, this dimension is not enough to
capture the full correlational structure of the tests. The necessary
additional dimensions are often called group factors, meant to
capture the possible clustering effect of different cognitive abilities,
perhaps linked to a single neuroanatomical region or circuit in the
brain. In specifying a multiple-factor structure for our data, we
grouped the tasks according to what we consider, together with
other researchers, to be core cognitive processes. In particular,
occluded reach, A-not-B, and reversal learning were all taken as
indicators of executive inhibition of reflexive lower-level responses.
Numerical discrimination and the food extraction puzzle were
specified as indicators of a problem-solving factor. Object tracking
and social tracking were specified as indicators of an ‘‘inspection’’
factor.
All replications of a given task were collapsed. Attempts to fit a
confirmatory factor model to the resulting data with standard
structural equation modeling software resulted in convergence
failures from a wide range of starting values. This is perhaps
unsurprising as our data departed in several ways from the ideal
conditions for the fitting of standard factor models with maximum
likelihood. These departures include small sample size (exacerbat-
ed by a high rate of missingness) and diversity across tasks of data
form and distribution (non-normal continuous measurements,
counts, binary outcomes).
To accommodate the distinctive features of our data, we
employed a Bayesian latent variable model that has been
successfully implemented in previous studies of primate cognitive
performance [9,19]; see Supplemental Protocol S1 for relevant
notation and further details. This approach mitigates the
limitations of small sample size and missing data by allowing
estimates of a parameter such as a task’s non-g variance to borrow
strength from estimates of related parameters (e.g., the corre-
sponding variances of other tasks). Further, it handles the disparate
data forms and distributions across tasks by converting them to the
common format of ranks. Lastly, because our study, and the
comparative analysis of the general factor across taxa make use of
the same statistics, we can more directly compare our results.
In brief, a latent variable was invoked to underlie each task to
account for the varying forms of the data, much as in the standard
generalized linear model. For example, if a task produced
dichotomous outcomes, then the model stipulated that a standing
on the latent variable less than a certain threshold resulted in the
lower rank for that animal; a standing on the latent variable higher
than the threshold resulted in the higher rank. This notion
generalizes in an obvious way to tasks producing more than two
ranks. Three sources of variance were modeled for each task’s
underlying latent variable: (1) a general factor affecting perfor-
mance on all tasks, (2) a group factor affecting only a subset of the
tasks, and (3) influences such as experimental error affecting that
task alone. Our main interest is in estimating the proportion of
each task’s latent variance attributable to the general factor. Recall
that the likelihood is the probability that a certain configuration of
model parameters will produce the observed data. In Bayesian
statistical inference, the product of the likelihood and the prior
probability of the configuration of model parameters is propor-
tional to the desired posterior probability of the configuration. (The
prior can be chosen in such a way that the marginal posterior
probability distributions of important parameters are not sensitive
to the prior’s precise specification.) Because the mathematical form
of the posterior probability is not analytically tractable, values of
the model parameters were sampled in proportion to their
posterior probability according to a hybrid Gibbs-Metropolis
algorithm that has been described elsewhere [25].
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